Activities and Modes of Operation within the CGIAR System: Options for the Future by Arnold, M.H.
Cotwltativc Gmtpou Mernatioual.Agridtud Research 
M4iiiryAddrrc 1811 H suu& N.W, W8sGogta~ D.C. 50433. u.sdL 
Ofria ~ocatfotc 80119th Swcc, N.W. 
Teitphoae (Ata code 202) 334421 
Cab& Add rew4NTBAFRAD 
From: The Secretariat Apri.1 10, 1990 
AGR/'TAC:IAR/90/4 
Consultative Group Meeting 
May 21 - 25, 1990 
The Hague, The Netherlands 
Agenda Item 4 
The Activities and Modes of Operation within the CGIAR System: 
Options for the Future (AGR/IX:IAR/90/4) was prepared by Dr. M.H. Arnold 
at the request of the TAC Chairman as a background paper for TAG 
discussions on the institutional options for an expanded CGIAR System. It 
outlines the principles on which the System has been based, poses 
questions on whether or not such a System is still necessary, and analyses 
those aspects that might be subject to change if the System expands. It 
is intended as a thought-provoking piece, not as an operational 
prescription for the future. Hcwever, it points to directions in which 
operational changes might be made to take into account changes already 
taking place and others that might be thought desirable for the future. 
A first draft of the paper was discussed by l!AC at its 50th meeting 
in Washington in October 1989. As a result of this discussion, a small 
panel was appointed to examine evolving relationships between 
international centres and national systems. A revised version of the 
relevant parts of the paper was made available to the panel, which met in 
Washington on 11 and 12 January, 1990. The whole paper was then revised 
and issued as a background document to the panels involved in assessing 
the non-associated centres. 
This version of the paper was discussed by TAC at its 51st Meeting 
in Rome in March 1990 and was also provided to the Centre Directors and 
Centre Hoard Chairmen at the joint session at that meeting. Their 
comments are currently being sought. It is now being released to a wider 
audience as a discussion document in order that TAC can have the benefit 
of further inputs on these important institutional issues before preparing 
the second part of its report on the non-associated centres. 
The paper should be considered as background material to Agenda 
Item 4: "'IX Chairman's Report". 
Attachments 
Distribution 
CGIAR Members 
Centre Hoard Chairmen 
Centre Directors 
TACChairman 
TACMembers 
TAC Secretariat 
AGR/m.c:xAR/90/4 
. 
ACTIVITIES AND MODES OF OPERATION WITHIN THE CGLAR SYSTEM: 
OPTIONS FORTHE FUTURE 
TACS-T 
FOOD AND AGRICULm ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
February 1990 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
1. Introduction 1 
2. Basic CGIAR Precepts 2 
2.1. The Original Concept of an International Centre 2 
2.2. The Political Dimension of CGIAR Affairs 3 
3. A Clean Slate Approach 4 
3.1. The Crucial Questions 4 
3.2.. The Case for Intemational'ReseaFch 5 
3.3. The Case for International Centres 6 
3.4. International Research and National Research Systems 7 
3.4.1. Definitions 7 
3.4.2. Collaborative Relationships 8 
3.4.3. Contracting Relationships 9 
3.4.4. Enabling Relationships 9 
3.4.5. Conflicting Priorities 10 
3.5. Strengthening National Research Systems 10 
3.5.1. The Role of International Centres 10 
3.5.2. International Centres as Development Agencies 11 
3.5.3. The Need for an Enabling Ebnction 12 
3.5.4. The Need for Coordination 13 
3.6. Division of Responsibilities Among Centres 14 
3.7. A Provisional Synthesis 17 
4. Conclusions 18 
ACTIVITIES AND MODES OF OPERATION WITHIN THE CGIAR SYSTEM: 
OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
1. Introduction 
The international institutes supported by the CGIAR and the 
national institutions with which they interact constitute a dynamic 
and evolving "System". Although the international component of the 
System’s structure is directly controlled by the Group, the 
institutes it supports are legally autonomous. The Group has not 
attempted, therefore to exert direct control over their activities 
or modes of operation. Broad control is exerted through the budgets 
recommended by TAC, but detailed control has been left to 
individual boards and managements. The centres are expected, 
however, to adhere to the “CGIAR philosophy” which has many facets, 
but has never been comprehensively recorded or formally agreed. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the institutes have sometimes 
departed, to a greater or lesser extent, from this basic philosophy 
of the System. Largely through “special projects”, boards and 
managements have exploited opportunities for extending their 
activities well beyond the provisions of their approved budgets, 
in ways that they have perceived as being consistent with their 
mandates, but which might not be consistent with the consensus of 
the Group. 
Testing the Group’s consensus on these more philosophical 
issues is not easy, however. It is possible only when major papers 
are discussed, such as reports of reviews of the System, or TAC 
papers on priorities and strategies. But the last review of the 
System was debated in 1981, and the i985 TAC paper on priorities 
and strategies did not discuss all the relevant issues. Indeed, it 
specifically recognized several important items of "unfinished 
business". 
Even the intended role of TAC is perceived differently among 
members of donor delegations. TAC is advisory, not executive. It 
does not control the detailed activities or modes of operation of 
the Centres. It does not set limits, in absolute terms, t.o the 
rate or extent of their growth. It evaluates the relevance and 
coherence of proposals for programmes and recommends budgets 
accordingly. 
Moreover, some of the changes that have taken. place alt the 
Centres have been noticed by TAC only retrospectively - during the 
budgetary process, as a consequence of external reviews, or through 
visits of TAC liaison scientists. Indeed, only since the new 
budgetary process has been introduced and all special projects have 
come under strut iny, has TAC been in a position to assess the 
overall pattern of a Centre’s activities and to test the 
consistency of current modes of operation with declared policies of 
the CGIAR. 
Evolution of modes of operation within the system has not 
therefore been strongly directed by tne CGIAR. Rather, the 
evolution itself has often pointed to the need for rationalization 
and the re-definition of policy. There is nothing particularly 
unusual or undesirable about this process, but something more is 
needed if logical decisions are to be made about future expansion 
of the system, either in its coverage of subject matter or in its 
modes of operation. 
This paper traces the origins of the basic precepts of the 
CGIAR System, analyses the causes of the changes that. have already 
taken place and, against a background of a “clean slate” approach, 
considers options for the future. It then discusses some broad 
principles related to whether the run-associated centres might or 
might not fit into an expanded CGIAR System. 
2. Basic CGIAR Precepts 
2.1 The Original Concept of an International Centre 
The first International Centres were created to do applied 
research on problems related to the food crisis. Solutions to the 
problems were needed urgently. Available resources were inadequate 
to contemplate strengthening national research capacities to the 
extent required to avert impending hunger and starvation. To get 
the research done as expeditiously as possible, the initial concept 
of an international centre was to bring together a critical mass of 
the best available scientists. They were given good support and 
facilities and were free to work within broad mandates, defined in 
terms of commodities, agro-ecological zones, or more specific. 
problems that were crucial to increasing food production in 
developing countries. 
Additional centres were progressively established, mainly on 
the basis of filling gaps in the overall. research coverage,. 
Initially, there was little perceptlon that it would eventually be 
desirable for this collection of independent institutions to evolve 
into a coherent system: that they should do anything other than 
research, training and the dissemination of information; or that 
any individual centre need exist for more than about twenty-five 
years. 
But views on all of these key concepts have now changed. 
Recent decisions by the Group call for greatly extended coverage. 
There is general support for the view that the System should be 
coherent, and that activities should, as far as possible, be 
harmonized across the System. These is a pervasive view that 
Centres should expand their role to include strengthening national 
agricultural research systems, aithougn ways in which this should 
be done have not been generally agreed. There also seems to be 
strong support for the view that, far from nearing the end of their 
usefui life, there will be a continuing need for internati.onal 
centres extending well into the next century. 
2.2 The Political Dimension of CGIPJ7 Affairs 
For the System to be effective, the donors must act in 
harmony, both in their collective decisions and in their individual 
dealings with the Centres they support. Each must therefore be 
sufficiently flexible to adjust its policies to fit the common 
philosophy. From the outset, it was the wish of the founding 
fathers that Centres should be insulated from those undesirable 
political influences that might divert them from the most 
expeditious way of bringing the greatest benefit in the shortest 
time to the greatest number of people in the developing countries. 
In essence, this degree of political insulation was achieved 
throuqh mechanisms designed to harness the opinions of the world 
scientific community to advise the Group, objectively, on 
priorities and strategies and.on the maintenance of scientific 
quality. TAC was created for these purposes and the tradition 
established that its members .were to be appointed as individuals, _ 
not as representatives of any nation or organization. The boards 
of trustees were designed to function in a similar way and,, with 
the exception of the host country, all members were also to be 
appointed in their capacity as individuals. The intention was 
that neither the decisions of the Group nor of the boards would be 
biased by the policies of any single donor or beneficiary nation, 
and that the decision-making processes would not be prolonged 
through conflicting political interaction. 
This principle of allowing priorities and strategies to be set 
objectively, with minimum political interaction, has been one of 
the principles that has contributed to the success of the System. 
It has profound implications, for example, for the types of 
institution, and types of funding that would fit easily into the 
mould. Institutions designed to serve a specific group of 
countries within a region or sub-region would be unlikely to be 
able to resist indefinitely the pressure for representation on 
their boards of the countries they served, and thereby come 
under political control. Equally, an international institute that 
was perceived, through its funding mechanisms, as promoting the 
policies of a single donor nation, might not be welcomed by some 
developing countries. 
Notwithstanding these principles, donors have always been 
entirely free to assert choices that are consistent with their own 
policies through their financial contributions to individual 
Centres. The biases in the overall pattern of activities that this 
might introduce, however, is then largely neutralized through the 
contributions of the World Bank, acting as “donor of last resort”. 
This unique method of determining priorities and allocating 
resources has been anotner Important key to the success of the 
CGIAR. It protects the institutions from short-term changes in 
policy and helps to ensure the contiiluity of effort that is vital 
for successful research. 
Not all of these basic principles, outlined above, have been 
strictly or consistently adhered to, however. Initial departures 
from them came partly from the desire to see the results of 
research implemented as quickly and as widely as possible. IRRI’s 
new package of technology for increasing rice yields could not be 
adopted by farmers in Indonesia, for example, until the national 
agricultural research system could be strengthened sufficiently to 
do the necessary adaptive research. Although technical assistance 
and the control of capital grants from bilateral funding formed 
no part either of the concept of the CGIAR System nor of IRRI’s 
mandate, it seemed logical to its board and management for IRRI to 
accept bilateral funding and get the job done. It could, at that 
time, legitimateiy do this without reference to TAC or the Group as 
a whole. -2 
It was in this and other ways that the “special project” came 
into being. At its best, the special project accelerated the 
agreed course of action of an individual centre. At its worst, it 
undermined some of ~the basic precepts of the CGIAR, exposed the 
Centres to the danger of biases in their policies, and made them 
vulnerable to the “criticism that they had acted in the interests of 
a single donor or a single developing country and not in the best 
interests of the developing countries as a whole. 
Both the First and Second Revietis of the System wrestled with 
the probl.ems introduced by special projects and bilateral funding 
and suggested guidelines on what might or might not be legitimately 
funded from these sources. In general, however, the Centres did 
not adhere very strictly to either set of guidelines. Although the 
new five-year budgetary process has attempted to eliminate the 
differences between core funding and special projects, some 
questionable requests continue to be made by donors to Centres, and 
TAC is left to sort out the anachronisms. 
It follows that neither the Centres’ perceptions of their 
opt imum modes of operation, nor the views of some of the donors on 
ways in which they might use the Centres most effectively, have 
always been in harmony with the underlying philosophy of the CGIAR. 
Put another way, there seem to be certain needs that could not be 
fully met if the basic precepts of the CGIAR System were rigidly 
adhered to. 
3. A Clean Slate Approach 
3.1 The Crucial Quest ions 
To satisfy ourselves that we can visualize a coherent system 
for the future, while preserving the essential precepts of the 
CGIAR, we have to ask some crucial questions. The answers to some 
of them may confirm what is alreacy in place. If they do, it 
should not surprise us because many of the considerations that led 
to the originai decisions have not changed. As we have seen, 
however, some of them have, and perceptions of the requirements 
have also changed. There may, therefore, be alternatives that 
are preferable to present modes of operation. 
As a start to the clean slate approach, let us consider the 
following questions: 
- Is internat ional researcn necessary? 
- Do we need international centres? 
- How should international centres interact with national 
research systems? 
- How should national research systems be strengthened? 
- HOW should centre activities in developing countries be 
coordinated? 
- How might responsibilities be divided among centres:? 
Although these questions will be diszussed without specific 
delineation of the subject matter to be covered, it is only 
sensible to take into account that we are considering research and 
related activities in the general areas of agriculture, forestry 
and aquaculture. 
3.2 The Case for International Research 
Among the industrialized countries, there are many examples of 
international research in the sense of groups of countries 
collaborating on specific research projects. In some instances, 
such as in certain aspects of nuclear physics, countries are 
brought together because of the sheer cost of doing the research 
individually. This implies a central research activity funded by 
subscriptions from all collaborating countries. In other 
instances, countries may collaborate to take advantage of the range 
of different skills or environments that a group of countries can 
provide. This implies a decentralized activity in which each 
collaborating country funds its own contribution. This type of 
collaboration is now commonly called a “network”. 
Both examples are equally relevant to developing countries 
but, in this paper, we are considering research and related 
activities in the context of international aid. We must therefore 
add to our considerations, both the donor perspective and the 
aspirations of the beneficiary nations. 
In providing aid for research and related activities, donors 
require that the funds they provide shall be used in a 
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cost-effective manner. In some respects it is as true now as it 
was when the first international centre was created that resources 
are limited and inadequate to meet all the potential needs. 
It is only natural, therefore, that donors should look for ways of 
concentrating the effort, avoiding duplication, and increasing the 
probability of success. This is analogous to the cost-sharing that 
OCCUIS in industrialized countries. 
. 
From the perspective of developing countries, however, funds 
used for research at international centres represent funds not 
available for their own national programmes. They would favour the 
research being done at international centres, therefore, only 
when it can be clearly seen to be more beneficial than the 
alternative of doing it through the national programmes., Indeed, 
some already have the trained personnel to undertake research of 
international relevance on a contractual basis, or through 
participation in a network, if a generally -acceptable way of 
provi:ding the funding and allocating the responsibilities could be 
worked out. 
3.3 The Case for International Centres 
It is the role of international centres to solve problems of 
wide applicability that would not be solved by developing countries 
on their own, because of inadequate resources or trained personnel, 
or because the problems would not be identified as having high 
priority in the national context. Coordinating the international 
conservation of genetic resources and their exploitation through 
genetic engineering would be gocd examples. 
Where the international orchestration of research appears to 
be the most cost-effective option, decisions must then be made on 
where the research should be done: at an international research 
centre, by contract to selected developing countries, or by 
contract to advanced institutions outside the international 
framework. 
International centres would be prime candidates for those 
parts of the work that require a relatively large group of 
experienced scientists and need to be done under appropriate 
ecological conditions. In contrast, advanced laboratory research, 
in genetic engineering for example, could be undertaken anywhere 
in the world and might well be more cost-effective if undertaken by 
contract to institutions outside the international system. 
The principle of contracting could be extended, however, to 
research on a great diversity of problems. Indeed, there is 
increasing scope for international research to be undertaken by the 
stronger developing countries, either individually or collectively, 
provided there is a suitable international body to administer it. 
This mechanism has the advantages that it can have a strong 
component of institution-building for the contracting developing 
country, and the research usually contributes to solving 
location-specific problems, as well as international ones. 
Contracting for international research should not be confused, 
however, with the provision of resources to national systems to do 
their own research. With this type of research, there will often 
be advantages in forming a network so that the scientists involved 
can exchange experiences. There might also be increased 
information to be obtained if the results were pooled for 
additional analysis and interpretation. In industrialized 
countries, these activities usually form part of the functions of 
scientific societies or of less formally constituted working 
groups. Although some have reasonably argued that this mode of 
doing research is international in character, it is not what 
is meant by ‘international research” in the context of this paper. 
Recognizing the importance to developing countries of being 
associated in networks, however, it has become tacitly accepted by 
some donors that the administration and funding of this type of 
network is a legitimate function of international centres. 
Moreover, it is explicitly stated as a primary function of some of 
the’ non-associated centres. 
It is, however, a function of international centres that was 
not analyzed eiiher by the first or second reviews of ttie CGIAR and 
has never therefore been explicitly endorsed by the Group. What 
was implicitly endorsed by the group was the concept that (with the 
exception of ISNAR and IBPGR) the centres should be institutions 
for research and training, and should not duplicate the functions 
of development agencies or bilateral donors. 
Consequently, in the clean slate approach, we must be clear 
about what this distinction might mean in practice, before we can 
decide whether or not it should still apply. The key to analyzing 
its implications lies in the various ways in which international 
centres interact with national research systems. To achieve 
consensus on these relationships will be one of the key issues in 
determining the future of the CGIAR and the types of institution it 
will be prepared to support. 
3.4 International Research and National Research Systems 
3.4.1 Definitions 
Centre involvement with national systems will either involve 
the centre in contributing resources (funding, technical 
assistance, etc.), or it will not. Let us first define those that 
do not, as “collaborative” relationships, whether they are 
concerned with research, training, the flow of information, or some 
other activity. Then, other relationships that are not 
“collaborative” will, by definition, involve the provision of 
resources. Let us define these as either “contracting” 
arrangements or “enabling” arrangements. 
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Under a contracting arrangement the centre will fund (from 
core or extra-core sources) a particular piece of research, or a 
training project that is within its mandate and forms part of its 
approved programme. Under an enabling arrangement the centre might 
contribute personnel (i.e. technical assistance), capital, or 
recurrent costs to enable a national system to do its own research 
or training in the centre’s mandated area, or to enable it to 
participate in a coliaborative or contractual relationship. 
These definitions can be applied whether the centre is 
involved with an individual national system, or with a group of 
national systems in a networking mode. Consequently, similar 
principles will broadly apply to both sets of circumstances. 
3.4.2. Collaborative Relationships 
The difficulty with collaborative relationships is that the 
national system must be strong enough in terms of human resources 
and fund ing , to act as an effective partner. Many ways have been 
promoted for overcoming this difficulty and, in recent years, there 
has been no stronger protagonist ct collaborative research than the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR). 
Although called a research centre, ACIAR is essentially a 
development agency, in that it facilitates collaborative research 
between scientists in Australian research institutions and those in 
developing countries, by providing the necessary resources. Using 
the terminology defined above, ACIAR fnlfills an “enabling” 
function, so that research scientists in other Australian 
institutes can undertake “collaborative” research. 
ACIAR has no direct counterpart in the CGSAR System, however, 
and the scientist-to-scientist linkages it establishes impose some 
constraints on the total number of scientists in the developing 
countries who can be involved at any one time. The networking 
principle helps to avoid constraints of this type and this is 
perhaps one reason why it has been much more prominent in the 
context of the centres, whether within the CGIAR System or not. 
There is no inherent reason wt.y collaborative networks in 
developing countries should not be organized in exactly the same 
way as those in industrialized courltries, provided the national 
systems have the resources to collaborate. Nor is there any 
reason why centres should not participate in them or, indeed, why 
they should not render scientific assistance, such as advising on 
the design of experiments, helping with the collation and analysis 
of results, or funding attendance of the participating scientists 
at periodic workshops. 
These would all be regarded as obvious functions of an 
international research institution. Conversely, to the extent that 
an international centre might contribute to a network by providing 
funding, equipment, or technical assistance to the individual 
countries, it would not be acting as a research institution, but as 
a development agency. 
- 
3.4.3. Contracting Relationskis 
- 
- 
Similar principles can be applied to contracting 
relationships. For example, in plant breeding programmes in 
industrialized countries, multilocation testing is achieved through 
contracts with cooperating organizations or individual farmers. 
Contracts are negotiated to re-imburse the contractor for the full 
economic costs incurred, plus perhaps a small bonus for 
cooperating. The rImher of such contracts is restricted to those 
necessary for the purpose of the research. 
To produce improved genetic material for developing countries, 
an international centre needs to do likewise. In reality, however, 
contracts with the national programmes might involve much more than 
just reimbursement for the economic costs. They might involve the 
provision of a vehicle, or a plot harvester, as well as additional 
funding for labour and staff in order to provide the resources for 
an effective national breeding programme. Moreover, many more 
countries might wish to participate than would strictly be 
necessary for the centrally directea research. To the extent that 
the centre might provide resources beyond those required for the 
centrally coordinated research, it would not be acting as a 
research institute but as a development agency. 
Contracts of this general type naturally extend to any 
research results, or new methodologies, that need to be validated 
over a range of environmental conditions - whether arising from 
research in the natural or the social sciences. Moreover, an 
international centre might wish to make special contractual 
arrangements with an individual national programme, for example to 
work on a specific plant disease or pest of wide importance, but 
not of regular occurrence at the centre location. 
This principle can be widened to take advantage of any special 
circumstance or skill within a national system that could be used 
to further the purpose of the international programme. Such 
contracts provide opportunities for making use of well-trained 
personnel in developing countries, giving them greater mot ivat ion 
and helping generally to strengthen national research capabilities. 
The costs involved might be less than would be involved in doing 
the work at an international centre. The main disadvantage is that 
it precludes the involvement of the weaker national systems. 
In all these contractual arrangements, however, similar 
distinctions to those already described for collaborative research 
would apply in relation to what might legitimately be regarded as 
part of the approved international research programme and what 
might, in reality, amount to direct development assistance to an 
individual country. 
3.4.4 Enabling Relationships 
In contrast, enabling relationships between international 
centres and national systems are those that are designed 
specifically to provide resources to individual national research 
systems. Their purpose might be to enable a national system to 
participate in a network or other collaborative relationship, to 
enable it to undertake a contract, or to enable it to undertake its 
own research or training in the centre’s mandated area. They 
involve the provision of funding, often involve individual donors 
and bilateral agreements, and sometimes involve technical 
assistance. 
The main advantage of involvement by centres in this type of 
activity is that it enables the centre to extend its working 
relationships to a greater number of developing countries, thus 
giving valuable feedback, and also providing opportunities for 
greater impact. These are some of the justifications that centres 
offer for becoming involved in activities that are essentially the 
role of development agencies. Whether or not the end justifies the 
means, there is no doubt that enabling mechanisms are essential if 
the work of international centres is to be translated into national 
development. 
3.4.5 Conflicting Priorities 
In all of these relationships, there will be questions of 
priority, especially with respect to whether the Centre’s 
priorities are in harmony with those of the national programme. 
Although priorities for contract research must be determined by the 
centre in relation to its approved international programme, 
priorities for collaborating and enabling arrangements should 
clearly be the prerogative of the countries involved. 
Even with contracting arrangements there must be agreed ways 
of avoiding conflicting priorities. Scarce expertise in national 
systems should not be diverted from activities of high national 
i priority to fulfil a centre’s need for contracted research. 
3.5 Strengthening National Research Systems 
3.5.1 The Role of Ir,ternational Centres 
To summarize, international research institutions would be 
expected to make their main contributions to strengthening national 
research systems through scientific collaboration and by providing 
information and improved genetic material. International 
development agencies would be expected to contribute through 
training, technical assistance, and capital grants. The issue is 
whether international centres should function in both capacities. 
As far as training is concerned, the involvement of centres is 
unlikely to be controversial. Although the training offered by 
centres could never become a substitute for formal training at 
universities, it can make an important contribution to the overall 
training needs of national research systems. Indeed, training 
is a natural function of international centres and fits comfortably 
into the philosophy discussed so far. 
Technical assistance and the administration of capital grants 
are not international in character, however, and are often 
associated with bilateral agreements that are inevitably influenced 
by the policies of a single donor. They are therefore more 
difficult to reconcile with the basic precepts of the CGIAR. 
These considerations give rise to important issues relating to 
possible ways in which the CGIAR should contribute more directly to 
strengthening national research systems. Many of the important 
considerations are implicit in the two questions that follow. 
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of international 
centres being involved in technical assistance and the 
administration of development funding? 
- What mechanisms, if any, should be adopted by an expanded 
CGIAR System foi fulfilling such enabling functions? 
3.5.2 International Centres as Development Agencies 
We have already seen some cf the advantages relating to the 
transfer of technology that centres derive from being involved in 
the scientific and technical aspects of enabling relationships with 
national systems. The centres can also benefit financially from 
the consultancy, coordination and other services for which they 
might legitimately be reimbursed. 
From the donor’s point of view, implementation of the research 
component of a bilateral development project by an international 
centre might present the easiest option. As well as being best 
placed to provide the technical input, Centres are often better 
placed than donor agencies -to recruit personnel for technical 
assistance and to provide them with logistical support. 
It might also be easier for the centre to administer the 
funding. Some donors have mechanisms for administering small 
grants, either through their own technical assistance activities, 
or through their embassies or high commissions. Others apparently 
have not. Some find it particulariy difficult to administer the 
small amounts of funding involved for each participating country in 
a networking activity. This is one of the reasons why they call on 
the centres to do it for them. 
There have undoubtedly been occasions when involvement-of 
centres in bilateral development projects has benefited both the 
centre’s research programme and the national systems involved, but 
there are also dangers in these relationships that tend to become 
greater as the centre’s involvement in them increases. Indeed, 
over-involvement in bilateral projects, whether with individual 
countries or in a networking mode, can have distorting and even 
corrupting effects on both the centre and the national systems. 
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For example, staff appointed as international scientists may 
have their productivity eroded through heavy routine 
administration. Pressure from individual donors may distort the 
centre’s priorities. A centre might seek participation in 
bilateral projects primarily to increase its budget or to achieve 
impact. This coul3 distort the prior it ies of the developing 
country. Centres can become over-committed, resulting in the 
recruitment of staff for technical assistance who have little more 
experience than the national scientists, and do not command their 
respect. In one or mere of these ways, the credibility of the 
centre might be undermined. 
Although all centre involvement in bilateral projects now 
comes under the scrutiny of TAC, it has been difficult for TAC to 
make adjustments to agreements that have already been entered into. 
* Furthermore, from the donor’s point of view, these grants are not 
fungible. To reject them would therefore mean depriving the 
developing countries of badly needed resources to strengthen their 
national research systems. Even classifying the projects as 
“desirable” and not “essential” has caused problems for both the 
donors and the centres. There is a limit, therefore, to the extent 
to which TAC itself can prevent the distortion of priorities, 
unless it were to take a more hardnosed attitude, which might well 
be regarded as unnecessarily obstructive by all concerned. 
Other dangers of too much involvement of centres in bilateral 
projects relate to the perceptions of the developing countries 
themselves. There is no doubt that many scientists in developing 
countries are coming to look upon the centres as donor agencies 
from whom resources can be obtained if a suitable request is 
made. That the particular request might be low on that country’s 
list of priorities, might be secondary to obtaining the funding and 
the perquisites that sometimes accompany it. These might include 
honoraria to individuals, enhanced per diem allowances, as well 
as the provision of vehicles or other items of equipment. The 
extent of these perquisites might even become a bargaining point 
for collaborating with one centre instead of another. 
All of these dangers nave been experienced to a greater or 
lesser extent in the CGIAR System and valuable experience has been 
gained on how to avoid them. Any proposal for expanding the 
System, however, needs to take them fully into account. 
3.5.3 The Need for an Enabling Function 
The enabling function is necessary only for the weaker 
national systems, but is essential if the benefits of centre 
activities are to be fully exploited. All of the benefits of 
centre interaction with national systems could be achieved, . 
however, through collaborative and contractual relationships. 
The dangers outlined above arise primarily when the centre also 
acts as the enabling agency. 
. 
- 
The logical inference *ould be that centres should not fulfil 
the enabling function. Such a policy would be acceptable, however, 
only if there were adequate alternative mechanisms for doing it. 
The fact that some of the non-associated centres explicitly fulfil 
an enabling function suggests either that there are not, or that 
certain donors prefer not to use them. 
Should some of the non-associated centres therefore be seen as 
enabling agencies and not, primarily, as international research 
inst.itutions? If so, is this an appropriate role to be fulfilled 
within the CGIAR System? Indeed, should some of them expand their 
enabling functions to become more comprehensive in coverage, thus 
facilitating the application of packages of results produced by 
other centres? . . 
As far as the CGIAR Centres are concerned, it has of ten been 
said that the problems could be avoided if the Centres showed 
greater constraint and the donors showed greater discipline. In 
reality, many members of the CGIAR abide by the unwritten rules and 
refrain from asking the Centres to act as implementing,agencies for 
their bilateral projects, while others have employed development 
agencies outside the System, such as Winrock International. 
An alternative would be for each Centre to fulfill the 
enabling function through a self-financing development unit, 
created specifically for this purpose within its overall structure, 
and actively seeking contracts with bilateral donors. Although 
such a proposal has not been explicitly discussed by the Group, 
past indications would suggest that ic would not be widely 
supported because of the different character it would imply for the 
System. For the “clean slate” approach, however, it will be 
necessary either to reaffirm or to reconsider this position. 
3.5.4 The Need for Coordination 
The need to avoid placing too great a burden on national 
systems, through the independent approaches made by severa. 
centres, has been raised many times, especially in the context of 
Africa. The problems are partly associated with the number of 
networks that are being created. They all have a collaborative 
function, but many have an enabling function or a contracting 
function as well. However, the increasing number of netwdrks is 
not solely determined by the needs of the countries. It arises 
partly from the enthusiasm of the centres to see national systems 
taking up their work, and partly from the encouragement centres get 
from bilateral donors to initiate them. In other words, the 
driving force is often supply, rather than demand. 
From the viewpoint of the national system seeking help, the 
number of centres operating in a single region may be a source of 
confusion. Whit; centre does it approach for advice on research 
with a farming systems perspective, for example, or for training in 
the design and analysis of field experiments? Any one of the 
commodity centres or resource-management centres might well be able 
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to help with these problems, or with a wide range of similar, 
non-specific problems. The country might well not know which 
centre to approach (how could it?) and there. might even be 
competition among the centres for an invitation to work with the 
country concerned. 
The problem might be alleviated in several ways. The centres 
and donors could voluntarily cooperate sufficiently closely to 
harmonize their activities and avoid the overload on national 
systems: coordination could be effected through a formally 
recognized mechanism or through a designated institution, either 
existing or created for the purpose: and attempts could be made to 
ensure that networks were initiated as a result of specific 
requests from developing countries, or regional organizations, 
rather- than from the wishes of centres or donors. 
These and similar ideas have been the subject of continuing 
debate and analysis by a diversity of interested parties, such as 
the Africa Task Force, SPAAR and numerous others. The small panel 
recently convened by TAC to consider possible options, concluded 
that, for collaborative and enabling arrangements, there is no 
viable, long-term alternative to a demand-driven system in which 
the countries themselves define the problems and determine the 
priorities. Moreover, recognczing the different strengths of the 
national systems and the difficulties experienced as a consequence 
of centres dealing separately and individually with a large number 
of developing countries, the panel also concluded that there was a 
strong case for centres adopting a transnational approach. 
The panel recognized that these conclusions have two major 
implications. They imply that centres must be able to respond to 
requests defined in terms of the countries’ own perceptions of 
priorities, as distinct from priorities defined by TAC or the 
centre; and they also imply that an essential link in the chain of 
collaboration is an effective mechanism for transnational 
consultation. While there are considerable regional differences 
that might affect the application of both these principles, it is 
clear that neither could be universally applied without significant 
changes to the present international research system. 
Before considering what those changes might imply, however, we 
must first consider ways in which responsibilities could be divided 
among a set of institutions designed to meet the global needs of 
developing countries for international research. 
3.6 Division of Responsibilities Amonq Centres 
Assuming that it would not be possible for all 
internationally-funded research to be orchestrated by a single 
centre, a rational way has to be found of deciding on the number of - 
centre.s required and how responsibiiities might be apportioned 
among them. Leaving aside the precise nature of the subject-matter 
coverage (which is not part of this paper), we may assume that the 
- 
research will be concerned broadly with disciplines, limiting 
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factors, eco-systems, commodities (species), and geographical 
regions. These broad divisions may be regarded as vectors in a 
multi-dimensional matrix. Perhaps one or more of these vectors 
might usefully be used as a basis for dividing responsibilities. 
Le.t us consider them in sequence. 
Dividing responsibilities on the basis of disciplines is 
characteristic of universities and institutions for basic research. 
It is far less appropriate for applied and strategic research, 
however, where the aim is the solution of problems, rather than the 
pursuit of academic excellence or the quest for new knowledge per 
se. The case for multidisciplinary institutes and strong 
interdisciplinary collaboration has frequently been argued for 
agricultural research, especially for the developing countries 
where solutions are dependent on the contributions of research in 
many different disciplines. We therefore reject a disciplinary 
basis for discriminating,among centres. 
Similar arguments apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to 
what. has sometimes been called “factor” research, presumably 
because it relates to those factors that limit production, be they 
physical, biological or socio-economic. Although institutes that 
concentrate on a single limiting factor have often made strong 
contributions to problems in applied research through their 
specialized approach, the problems to be solved seldom relate to a 
single limiting factor. While it might well be workable’, therefore, 
to define responsibilities according to limiting factors in the 
context of a single country, such institutes would not be 
well-placed to provide the degree of integration that is required 
for a global system of research in the context of development. 
Division of responsibilities on ecological grounds, however, 
has much to commend it, especially in the context of integrating 
all relevant aspects of resource management, production systems, 
and preserving the quality of the environment. It is consistent 
with individual centres having global mandates i.e. each centre 
could have global responsibility for a particular eco-systebm 
throughout the wcrld. Its main disadvantage is that it would not 
be congruent with any aspect of the administrative services in 
developing countries that are concerned with research and 
development, except perhaps for those concerned with irrigation 
schemes (regarding irrigated agriculture as an ecosystem).. 
Moreover, assuming the multi-disciplinary nature of their work, 
some duplication of effort among centres would be involved because 
of the lack of congruence between commodities and ecosystems 
(maize, for example, is important over a wide range of ecosystems). 
Division of responsibilities according to commodities, or 
groups of commodities, also has several attractions and solme 
draw-backs. Although most production systems involve more than one 
commodity, well-directed production research built around a single 
commodity, or group of commodities, can strongly integrate work in 
different disciplines and on different limiting factors. Perhaps 
for this reason, extension packages are often most successfully 
promoted when they are built around a single commodity. Division 
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according to commodities aiso links directly to nationai 
development plarls, in that some of the targets are usually defined 
in terms of commodity production. 
Its disadvantages arise mainly from over-emphasis on the 
single commodity approach, or on a jingle limiting factor, such as 
genetic adaptation. Moreover, division of responsibilities 
entirely on a commodity basis involves duplication of effort, 
especially in research on resource management and related subjects. 
Division according to geographical boundaries, i.e. according 
to regions or sub-regions, would have much to commend it in terms 
of logistics, close collaboration with national systems, and the 
organization of networks. A further, related advantage would be 
that developing countries within a region need collaborate with 
only one centre. 
Geographical boundaries are also political boundaries, 
however, and the concept of international centres with independent 
governance, insulated from political influences, is incompatible 
with the concept of regional organizations with intergovernmental 
control. This is not to discount the value of regional 
organizations, but simply to recognize their different character. 
Another limitation of the geographicai division of responsibilities 
among international centres is that it would mean a great deal of 
overlap in their research programmes and information services. 
Using a single vector for discriminating among centres, 
therefore, ecosystems and commodities appear to have the most to 
commend them and, perhaps, the least serious disadvantages. To 
discriminate entirely among centres using either the one, or the 
other, however , would mean compromising on the disadvantages 
already mentioned. If it has been possible in the past to marry 
the requirements of a good commodity research programme with the 
requirements of a programme directed more broadly towards 
sustainable production systems, (and there has been variable 
success in this respect), it is likely to become more difficult, if 
not impossible, in future, for two main reasons. 
First, research directed towards the improvement of 
sustainable production systems will have to be multi-commodity in 
its coverage and move into areas of research on land use and 
conservation that lie outside those normally dealt with in’ 
commodity production research. Second, research directed towards 
the improvement of commodities will increasingly become more 
specialised as researchers seek to exploit developments in 
biotechnology, giving rise to the need for new economies of- scale 
in the provision of the necessary laboratories and equipment. 
Consequently, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion 
that, in future, there will be a need for two types of 
international institute. Those with an agro-ecological focus and 
those with a commodity focus, each dependent on the others, and 
collaborating closely to meet the needs of developing countries. 
- 
- 
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On this basis, it is possible to envisage two interconnected 
sets of centres, all with global mandates, but one set based on 
ecosystems and the other on commodities. The ecosystem centres 
would act as hosts (sometimes referred to as “relay stations”) for 
all the commodity centres with which they needed to collaborate in 
that particular e’cosystem. 
Perhaps the division of responsibilities among existing CGIAR 
Centres, partly on the basis of ecosystems and partly by 
commodities, is more logical than rt has sometimes appeared, but 
considerable adjustments to existing mandates would be required to 
make it fully coherent. Indeed, a clear distinction between 
commodity centres and agro-ecological centres would imply a 
rational division of responsibilities, but would be viable only 
with unrestricted collaboration between the two types. 
To combine existing CGIAR centres and non-associated centres 
in a global system following these principles would imply major 
changes to both sets, and could be contemplated only if the 
resulting global system could be predicted to serve the needs of 
the developing countries in more cost-effective ways. Such a 
prediction must be based both on an analysis of the needs and of 
the most effective institutional mechanisms. Other TAC papers have 
analyzed the needs in terms of subject matter. In this paper we 
take these needs as given and pursue the institutional options by 
combining the analyses in sections 3.5 and 3.6 of this paper. 
3.7 A Provisional Synthesis 
We have seen that national systems must be able to dr.aw from 
the centres what they want in terms of national priorities, rather 
than what is available to them in terms of centre priorities. A 
commodity centre restricted by its mandate to work on speciEic 
commodities, for example, might not be well placed to provide an 
effective service broadly related to research on the produc%ion of 
annual crops in the context of soil conservation and watershed 
management. However, a centre with an agro-ecological mandate 
would be, and there would be no conflict of priorities. 
The inference is that, especially with increasing emphasis on 
environmental issues, there would be many circumstances in ‘which 
the needs of national systems could be more comprehensively met by 
agro-ecological centres than by commodity centres. As we have 
seen, however, the model does not imply the end of commodity 
centres. On the contrary it implies a more focused approac:h to 
commodity improvement, allowing commodity centres to specialize in 
those areas where they have traditionally excelled, with the more 
applied work being decentralized and done in collaboration with 
agro-ecological centres. Indeed, there are many precedents in the 
CGIAR System for this type of relationship, one of the more recent 
examples being the scientists from seven different centres working 
on problems of the semi-arid tropics at the ICRISAT Sahelian 
Centre. 
In addition to providing facilities for researchers from other 
centres, agro-ecological centres would have their own programmes of 
research in the natural and social sciences related to resource 
management and production systems, including forestry and 
agro-forestry. They would also need to have strong linkages with 
policy research. Moreover, they would be well placed to become the 
lead international centres for a given geographical region or 
sub-region, thereby exploiting the advantages of regional centres, 
but avoiding the disadvantages (see section 3.6). 
In their relations with national programmes, lead centres 
would build on the diversity of useful experience already gained 
from evolving relationships with national systems in the main 
geographical regions. In Africa, they would take fully into account 
the work of SPAAR and the Africa Task Force. In this context, 
the distinction made by the Africa task force between the “control” 
of project funding (how it is spent) and its “administration” 
(general accounting, coping with foreign exchange regulations, etc) 
is one that might usefully enter into the vocabulary for discussing 
these issues. 
A major aim would be to move to a set of relationships in 
which priorities for work with national systems were determined by 
regional or sub-regional associations of countries or scientists, 
organized either under the umbrella of a political entity, or as an 
officially approved steering committee. 
- 
Contractual relationships 
required either by agro-ecological or by commodity centres, to meet - 
the requirements of their own research programmes, could also be 
facilitated by the same consultative procedures. Enabling 
relationships would be controlled through the regional entity and 
administered by the most appropriate agency, determined in 
consultations involving the donor, or donors, the regional 
mechanism and the lead centre. 
The model implies that commodity centres would initially 
consult with national systems through the lead centre for the 
region, a procedure that might be seen by commodity centres as 
diminishing their access to national scientists and the 
collaboration that ensues from it. It would take time and 
sensitivity to overcome such fears. Moreover, there might well be 
disadvantages if the procedures for consultation were permitted to 
become unduly bureaucratic, but the trade-off would be the better 
fulfillment of national needs and expectations, closer 
collaboration, and avoidance of some of the pit-falls of the past. 
4. Conclusions 
Continued expansion of the CGIAR System has caused concern 
among the donors about future funding - of existing work, of new 
ventures, and of the non-associated centres, if they were brought 
into the System. The analysis above indicates that it might be 
possible to achieve a coherent international research 
system, covering all the desired types of activity, without 
requiring an unrealistic increase in funding. 
- 
- 
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First, there has to be a hard look at the need for work at 
international centres, as compared with a decentralized approach 
with greater contracting to national programmes. Second, the total 
number of centres has to be assessed in relation to the desired 
coverage and the most efficient division of responsibilities. 
Third, there needs to be agreement on the role of international 
centres in strengthening national capabilities. 
Greater investment in contract research would be more flexible 
and, in certain circumstances, more cost-effective than a 
centralized approach. It might also tap sources of funding 
unavailable for the core budgets of centres. Moreover, 
rationalization of centre involvement in enabling arrangements with 
national systems might lead to a reduction of centre budgets, as 
well as to a reduction of the administrative burden on centre 
scientists. 
The all-pervading aims would be: to make the most 
cost-effective use of availanle scientific expertise, whether 
employed nationally or internationally: to catalyze productive 
working relationships among all concerned; and to shape the 
institutional framework accordingly. With appropriate adjustments 
to the present division of mandates and responsibilities, new 
activities could be incorporated into the CGIAR System while 
keeping the total number of Centres within the bounds of reasonable 
funding expectations. 
